Line-by-Line Analysis of UN Resolution 1441 on Arms Inspections in Iraq

By Phyllis Bennis

8 November 2002


Anti-war forces in the U.S. and around the world can claim the United Nations Security Council inspections resolution as a partial victory. The resolution does not endorse the use of force, it redefines the Iraq crisis, at least in the international arena, as one of disarmament, not overthrow, and it will at least delay a U.S. attack. It gives us a powerful tool to fight for U.S. accountability to multilateralism and the UN. But it still reflects the heavy-handed domination of the U.S. over the UN and the rest of the world, and ultimately sets the terms for war.

The real victory lies in the fact that the Bush administration felt it necessary to go to the United Nations at all. Only last summer the Pentagon's "chicken hawks" appeared to have derailed any UN-based strategy for Iraq. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained skeptical of war; polls showed less than a quarter of Americans supported attacking Iraq without the UN; and hundreds of thousands of protesters filled the streets. Washington's closest allies, from Germany to Mexico and even Tony Blair's own Labor Party, railed against growing U.S. unilateralism. The super-hawks didn't want this resolution, but they lost.

That the anti-UN Bush administration took eight weeks to negotiate the terms of resolution 1441, reflects the enormous international and domestic opposition to the Bush administration's planned war for oil and empire. The resolution puts additional pressure on Washington to at least appear to be acting in concert with the international community; a solo war will be a much harder sell. While the Republican sweep of the mid-term election will certainly further empower the administration's most unilateralist voices, diminishing public support in the U.S. for a solo attack, bolstered by the UN resolution, may act as a brake on that trajectory.

The U.S. made significant concessions to win support for its text. But back-room deals with France and Russia regarding oil contracts in a post-war Iraq were a big part of the picture. And the impoverished nation of Mauritius emerged as the latest poster child for U.S. pressure at the UN. The ambassador, Jagdish Koonjul, was recalled by his government for failing to support the original U.S. draft resolution on Iraq. Why? Because U.S. aid, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, requires that the recipient "does not engage in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests."

Every Council ambassador, even the British, speaking after the unanimous vote, made clear the resolution provides no authorization for war. French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte said it requires a Council meeting in the event of Iraqi non-compliance. "France welcomes the elimination from the resolution of all ambiguity on this point," he said. Mexico's Ambassador, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, was probably the most direct. Force is only valid, he said, "with the prior, explicit authorization of the Security Council."

For almost every country on the Council the vote was less about constraining Iraq, than about constraining the U.S. Whether they succeed or not, the ambassadors' words place them on the side of the international anti-war forces.

Nothing in the resolution gives Washington the right to determine whether Iraq is in "material breach" of its obligations, nor to decide what to do if there is such a breach. But Washington claims exactly those rights. And nothing in the resolution text explicitly rejects that claim, or reasserts the UN Charter's clear statement that only the Council as a whole has the authority to make such decisions, not the U.S. alone

There is no evidence that the Bush administration has any intention of basing its go-to-war decision on what the UN resolution actually says, or even on what the inspectors find or don't find. If they are looking for a pretext, the super-tough inspection requirements provide plenty.

This analysis examines the problems and limitations of the resolution's text.

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,

Recognizing the threat Iraq’s noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,

Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,

Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,

Commending the Secretary General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary General for their efforts in this regard,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,


1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

This language is specifically designed to set the stage for a U.S. military attack. Being in "material breach," if determined by the Council, is a precursor to the Council authorizing military enforcement. The assertion that Iraq "has been and remains" in material breach is part of the U.S. effort to claim a continuing authorization of the use of force. If the U.S. were serious about determining Iraqi compliance or non-compliance, it would ask the UN inspectors to return immediately to Iraq, and only after they finished their work and reported to the Security Council would the Council make a determination regarding compliance or breach. Washington's insistence on this term is a major part of the French and Russian opposition to the U.S. proposal.


2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

This language was inserted to soften earlier drafts' references to "serious consequences" so close to the beginning of the resolution. Some countries, and some U.S. commentators, have claimed that the reference to "full and verified completion" is designed as a "carrot" for Iraq regarding the lifting of economic sanctions, which is supposed to follow the full and verified completion of disarmament. However, given the explicit U.S. position that sanctions will remain as long as Saddam Hussein is in power, and given that the resolution does not specifically assert anything regarding the sanctions, it is a very weak carrot at best.
In fact, the reference to a "final opportunity" to comply represents a clear threat of military attack.


3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

This seems to be an effort to insure Iraq's inability -- regardless of intent -- to comply with these very stringent terms. This is asking Iraq to essentially do the initial work of the inspection team itself, cataloguing its entire WMD programs as well as programs never included in the earlier demands. The original inspections mandated in resolution 687 did not include, for example, "delivery systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons" etc. Resolution 687 also included only long-range missiles, with a range over 150 km, not "all" ballistic missiles. The terms are significantly stricter here.


4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraph 11 and 12 below;

This sets Iraq up with a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. If they claim they have no WMD material to declare, Washington will identify that as evidence of the "continuing breach" based on the unproved, but functionally unchallenged, U.S. assertion that Iraq does have viable WMD programs. If Iraq actually declares viable WMD programs, it similarly proves the U.S. claim of continuing breach of resolution 687.
The last sentence's reference, however, to paragraph 11 and 12, was the final compromise demanded by France, Russia, Mexico and other Council members before passing the resolution. The significance is that determining what Iraqi action constitutes a breach, bringing that breach to the Council and thus triggering the immediate convening of the Council to assess the violation, can only be done by the UN inspectors -- UNMOVIC and IAEA -- and not by Washington alone.


5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

The effect of moving scientists and their families outside of Iraq would be to have UN arms inspectors acting as asylum officers. Certainly many, perhaps most scientists would jump at the opportunity right now to leave Iraq with their families and be granted asylum somewhere else. They are living, after all, in a country not only devastated by 12 years of crippling economic sanctions and the ravages of a repressive political regime, but also facing the likely possibility of imminent war. There are certainly legitimate reasons why many Iraqi scientists would want to live and work somewhere with greater safety and political freedom. There is also, however, the consequent and understandable likelihood of scientists exaggerating the level of Iraq's military or WMD programs as well as their own role in those programs, in the hope of persuading international immigration officials of their importance. And finally, another longer term result of such an effort, if carried out on a large scale, will be the stripping of a key component of Iraq's national intellectual and scientific base, with seriously deleterious effects on future efforts to rebuild a modern society.


6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;

This letter asserts a set of arrangements allegedly agreed to by Iraq, without confirmation from Iraq that it did indeed accept those arrangements.


7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq , to facilitate their work in Iraq:

Deciding to disregard existing resolutions and agreements made between Iraq and the United Nations, without any determination as to why those earlier arrangements should not be respected, undermines the legitimacy, consistency and coherence of UN resolutions.

-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available;

This language represents a compromise between the necessity of having the inspectors be UN employees, accountable only to the United Nations itself (important because of the history of earlier inspection regimes which provided information to U.S., Israeli and other intelligence agencies), and the claim of U.S. and other diplomats that only certain countries (mainly the U.S. and UK), actually have adequately trained personnel.

-- All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA ;

-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998);

Sidelining the existing terms of 1154 (which set special arrangements, including diplomatic accompaniment, for inspection of the eight designated "presidential sites") undermines the legitimacy of UN decision-making. Iraq's acceptance of this provision of course represented one of the most significant concessions by Baghdad.

-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;

-- Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient UN security guards;
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;

These two together blur the distinction between inspection and occupation. The resolution requires Iraq to accept unlimited numbers of UN Blue Helmets to guard the inspectors' facilities. The U.S. backed down from an earlier demand that the resolution include deployment of national (read: U.S.) military troops as well as UN guards. But the final language still implies a threat to the safety of the inspectors. In fact, there is no history of UNSCOM inspectors at their bases or centers being threatened in the past; the need for armed guards there has no clear basis. There is no clarity here what "UN security guards" mean; will the U.S. be satisfied with normal UN Blue Helmet security personnel, perhaps seconded to Iraq from their positions as security guards at UN headquarters in New York? Or will Washington use this language to demand more heavily armed military personnel, perhaps seconded not from other UN posts but from member states, ostensibly operating under UN authority? Although the earlier draft's reference to "member states" providing troops to enforce "no-fly/no-drive" zones was deleted from the final draft, it is not clear that the U.S. has completely given up on including national military forces -- presumably including U.S. troops.

Even without a direct authorization for national armies to participate, the resolution calls for what amounts to a functional occupation of Iraq by UN military forces. The final resolution deleted language referring specifically to "no-fly/no-drive" zones in Iraq. But it does give inspectors the right to "freeze" a site for inspection by creating "exclusion zones" and "transit corridors," and refers specifically to Iraq's being required to "suspend ground and aerial movement" which amounts to no-fly/no-drive zones in other words. Authorizing the UN inspection agencies to declare "no-fly/no-drive" zones will allow them to control potentially huge swathes of Iraqi territory. Creation of functional no-fly/no-drive zones itself reflects the U.S. history of taking control of large parts of Iraqi air space, and consequently Iraqi land, through the unilateral creation of "no-fly" zones in northern and southern Iraq. These existing zones, imposed by the U.S. and the British (France briefly participated, then backed out) have no basis in international law; they are not authorized, or even mentioned, in any UN resolution. Authorization of such zones in this new resolution imposes a UN imprimatur on a continuing violation of UN resolutions -- particularly their references to other countries respecting Iraq's territorial integrity.

-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;

-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and

-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;

While some may believe it is implicit, this section does not identify "weapons material" or some such standard to judge what may be "taken" and "exported." The clear language, as written, would allow inspectors to seize and "export" anything they come across in the course of doing inspections -- trucks, computers, carpets -- whether or not those items have anything to do with prohibited materials or prohibited WMD or missile programs.


8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

This language is clearly aimed at demanding Iraqi compliance with the U.S.-British air patrols and bombings going on in the so-called "no-fly" zones. Neither creation nor military enforcement of those zones was ever authorized by the United Nations; no UN resolution before this one ever even mentioned "no-fly" zones. This section would serve to legitimize the eleven-year-long illegal U.S.-British imposition of "no-fly" zones, and the four-year-long illegal bombing raids carried out there. The U.S. claims that those bombing raids, and the imposition of the zones themselves, are to "enforce" UN resolutions -- specifically 688, which calls on Iraq to protect the human rights of various communities. But in fact the bombing is without any actual UN authorization. So far the Security Council has never called the U.S. and Britain to account for their illegal actions; this language serves to legalize those actions instead. While not specifying what would constitutes a "member state taking action to uphold any Security Council resolution," and not specifying who can determine whether any action is in fact upholding a Council resolution, the U.S. interprets this language to require that Iraq allow any action -- including illegal military actions -- that the U.S. claims is enforcing a resolution. Several other Council members, including France and Russia, specifically stated their interpretation that Article 8 does not refer to the bombing of the "no-fly" zones; but Washington holds exactly the opposite view. This language also denies the limitations on the use of military force to enforce Council resolutions. Even if the Council itself makes the decision, not all its resolutions can be enforced by military means. Only those resolutions specifically passed under the terms of Chapter VII can lead to the use of force. Resolution 688, which the U.S. cites as authorizing bombing of the "no-fly" zones, was not passed under Chapter VII; quite the contrary, it reaffirms "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq."


9. Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

Because there is no specified consequence here for a potential Iraqi delay or lack of cooperation (which is also not defined), it is likely the U.S. will interpret this section as authorizing immediate and unilateral military force. No such force would be authorized or appropriate, but there is a history of usurpation of such language.


10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

This implies that UNMOVIC must share its actual findings and raw data with "the Council," meaning intelligence operatives from Council member states, including those mobilized to overthrow the Iraqi regime (such as the U.S.). When UNMOVIC was created, its director made clear that his view of intelligence sharing was that it could only be "one way" -- meaning member states could provide UNMOVIC with information to assist their inspection work, but UNMOVIC would not provide reciprocity to national intelligence agencies. Such reciprocity would, he rightly recognized, repeat the disaster of UNSCOM's unauthorized sharing of intelligence material with U.S. intelligence agencies. Calling here for UNMOVIC to report "the results" of its interviews and data to the Council indicates a clear U.S. intention to gain access to UNMOVIC and IAEA data.


11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security;

This clear language should prohibit any country -- including the United States -- from acting unilaterally in response to any perceived Iraqi obstruction. The meaning is that the inspectors' reports to the Council would serve to trigger the immediate convening of the Council to consider next steps. However, given Bush administration officials' consistent claim that they need "no further" UN resolutions to authorize the use of force "to enforce" UN resolutions, it is highly doubtful that Washington intends to adhere to this language.

The inclusion of the reference "in order to restore international peace and security" is a code for proceeding immediately to using force, whether or not authorized by a new "consideration of the situation". It is certain the Bush administration will point to this reference if they choose to go to war without actual Council consent. The resolution specifically does not call for an actual formal meeting of the Council and a new resolution, but only the informal call "to convene." This was an artful way to negotiate between the French, Russian, Mexican and other countries' demand for a second resolution to authorize any future action, and the U.S. refusal to accept such a requirement. As written, the resolution does not authorize the use of force, but neither does it explicitly prohibit such use of force. Any action, however, by any country, would have to keep in mind the preeminent requirements of the UN Charter -- which does prohibit any use of force except when authorized by the Council.


13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

The problem is how to define the consequences. Washington uses the term to refer explicitly to military force; for this reason, France and Russia have objected to the use of the term in the new Council resolution. In 1998, when the UN Security Council passed a resolution endorsing Kofi Annan's negotiated stand-down with Iraq, the resolution called for "severest consequences." At that time, every Council ambassador except that of the U.S. said explicitly that use of the term did not constitute an automatic authorization of the use of force for any country or group of countries. It did not, they said, include what the Russian ambassador called "automaticity." The U.S. ambassador, Bill Richardson, alone of all the Council, said, "we think it does" authorize immediate unilateral use of force.


14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

This is a fundamental point of principal -- it means that the issue of Iraqi requirements and Iraqi compliance remains on the Security Council's agenda, and only the Council itself can make decisions as to future interpretation or enforcement.